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Techniques vs Practical Experience
by GORDON L . M U R R A Y

Partner, E x e c u t i v e Office
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Executives
Institute,
Columbus—November

Financial
1964

I

ORIGINALLY DEVELOPED the material for this talk i n response to a
request from the L o s Angeles Chapter of The Financial Executives
Institute that I speak on this specific subject. They asked that the talk
touch on four points:
Effectiveness of Operations Research and Pure Mathematics vs. Practical Experience.
A r e computers taking over and financial executives becoming obsolete?
Is the financial man relinquishing part of his responsibilities to new
specialists—by default, by lack of training, or unwillingness to
accept new changes?
What is effective management and how may the financial man keep himself abreast of new developments?
The L o s Angeles request ended up by suggesting, "Please make this
controversial, if you want to."
I liked this last point but the fact is, I don't have to. T h e very
essence of the subject matter is controversial. Business literature is
replete with comment on this subject. The whole matter is being
churned, analyzed, and discussed and no clear pattern of thought appears to have emerged.
Comment runs the whole range from speculation of the Jules Verne
science-fiction variety to a cynical attitude that scientific managementoperations research-mathematical sciences are a fad without substance
and without a real contribution to make i n business affairs. A speaker
on this subject has several choices open to him. H e can dream and
speculate that the mathematician and the computer are about to inherit,
if not the earth, at least the management of our business affairs. H e
can speculate and philosophize on the socio-economic effect of the mathscience-computer trend. O n the other hand he can debunk the whole
subject and conclude that all this is not for him or his company—that
the subject is "way-out"—and he can be amused by it all.
I too like to dream and speculate about what may be i n the future,
but circumstances require that I earn my living by dealing with what is
here today. It is difficult to " s e l l " what "may be" as a professional
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service. Clients tend to want practical solutions to difficult problems—
today. Implementation of a reasonable solution is the thing, even though
there may be a better answer tomorrow. Circumstances therefore require that I be a pragmatist i n approaching this whole subject.
M y thesis is to suggest that the pragmatic view is also the position
for you to take. Certainly, you should speculate on the ultimate possibilities of these developments and as a minimum keep abreast of what
is going on. The returns from speculation have real limits, however, in
terms of accomplishments today and i n the near future. Y o u can stand
on the sidelines too long and never get i n the game. If you wait for the
ultimate in a computer you will never live to get one; if you put off
attempting new ways to solve old problems until the perfect answer is
at hand someone else will reap the rewards. W h y not take what can be
applied now to a problem of dimensions that you can get your arms
around and have at it?
Before discussing more specifically how the pragmatist goes about
getting into the game, let me very briefly identify the developments that
are of concern in this subject—operations research or management
science, and the computer.
OPERATIONS RESEARCH (OR)—MANAGEMENT SCIENCE*
The first identification of operations research came during W o r l d
W a r I I when persons with a variety of backgrounds but heavily from
the mathematical and scientific disciplines were assigned to work on
various military problems i n computing trajectories, radar problems,
hunt and search techniques and the like. These people were exposed
to a whole series of problems i n different subject matter than they were
exposed to i n their prior training and experience, yet found that the
techniques at their disposal had application. Some of these people continued to apply their academic techniques and wartime experience to
subject matter outside their immediate discipline after the war ended
and inevitably gravitated into the business sphere. B y the early 1950s
these people began to emerge as organized groups and had begun to
assert themselves as having a unique approach and common body of
O R knowledge. They now maintain that operations research is a unity—
that regardless of the type of situation or activity under scrutiny there
is the common characteristic of a mathematical model and that all O R
problems may be classified as inventory, allocation, queuing, sequencing,
*Points made in this section re characteristics of O R are taken from Ackoff
Rivett, A Managers
Guide to Operations
Research.

and
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routing, replacement, competition, and search. These, they identify as
the eight different types of problems that confront the manager.
The essential characteristics of the O R method are systems orientation, use of inter-disciplinary (or mixed teams), and the adaptation
of the scientific method.
Systems orientation refers to the theory that the activity i n any
part of an organization has some effect on every other part. Sort of the
thigh-bone connected to the hip-bone, hip-bone connected to the backbone concept. I n deference to this " l a w " the operations researcher says
he must identify all significant interactions and evaluate their combined
impact on the performance of the organization as a whole, not merely
on the part originally concerned. Therefore the operations researcher
is exhorted to avoid the natural inclination to cut a very complex problem down to size and isolate it from its environment—to avoid eliminating aspects of the problem that make it difficult to solve, and thereby
reduce it to one that can be handled by standard techniques or by judgment based on experience. Rather, it is held that a system orientation
requires moving i n the opposite direction, to the deliberate expansion
and complication of the statements of the problem until all significant
components are contained i n it. This approach consists of covering the
entire area under a manager's control and not of concentrating on some
special aspect. I read that the ultimate of this philosophy is the total
synthesis of the " f i r m " — a model that comprehends all the interacting
factors affecting a business—external and internal.
Stated facetiously, the O R purist, I suppose, would solve nothing
until he could solve everything.
This theory of ever expanding the definition of a problem before
coming to grips with it may have some validity to the researcher. T o
me, as one seeking better answers to a client's problems for a fee, it is
generally just not practical. In fact it could represent professional suicide should the client decide that problem enlargement was for my
benefit rather than for his benefit. This is not to say that one should
accept a client's limited definition of a problem without questioning to
be certain you are dealing with the real problem or to seek to get sufficient hold of the problem to be able to make a significant contribution.
Rather, it is to say that to the pragmatist a practical end is to come up
with a practical improvement that can be implemented i n a practical
way—whether or not the solution is the very ultimate that may someday
be achieved. A little later on I will illustrate from my experience the
conflict that can arise between the research and pragmatic point of view.
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T o be fair I must acknowledge that those practicing O R i n business finally must accept and do accept the limitations of the systems
approach i n everyday life. Their doctrine, however, calls for such limitations to be viewed as a serious imperfection, which they should strive
to overcome through enlargement of the problem. I would ask: What
is wrong with a substantial improvement i n a significant piece of the
problem? M y clients seek an improvement i n a known period of time
for a predeterminative fee; i n short, they are more interested i n improving their Operation than i n subsidizing my Research.
The second characteristic of O R is the use of interdisciplinary
teams. This means that to qualify as an O R achievement, the solution
must result from group effort—a group comprised of an engineer,
physicist, economist, and accountant, for example. They say this came
about originally through necessity, because of a shortage of scientists of
any single breed. Later they found that the mixed team was necessary
to good solutions—and I guess that only the good solutions are O R
solutions. The principle here is that before you begin to study a problem
you cannot anticipate its characteristics or the best way to look at it so
you had best have as many different viewpoints and different solutions
as possible available at the start.
O n the face of it this is a difficult position to refute. Of course, the
greater the number of different points of view that are focused on a
problem the greater the number of angles that are likely to be discovered.
T o be pragmatic again, I am not convinced that this is altogether necessary to get close to the target most of the time. Given an understanding of business problems, experience i n problem-solving, and knowledge
of the main core of techniques known to be applicable to these problems
something less than an interdisciplinary team can achieve very useful
improvements.
The third characteristic of O R is the adaptation of the scientific
method. Here the OR'er is referring to experimentation. H e reasons
that he is at a disadvantage i n applying the scientific method because
business problems do not lend themselves to laboratory study. The
risks are usually too great to use the business under study as the "laboratory" and have the business try out various approaches to see what
happens and what works. H e gets around this limitation by building a
mathematical model of the situation i n which the pertinent factors are
recognized and in which these relationships are expressed and quantified.
Of course some factors are controllable and others are not and i n business problems quantification necessarily requires estimation. Through
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use of the model, however, he is able to experiment by trying different
factors, different combinations, and different values. The moment of
truth comes when the solution is implemented and applied i n actual
practice. In preparation for this, the solution is sometimes applied retroactively to see whether it yields an improvement over what actually
resulted under the old method. A l l this comes under the heading of
model-building and simulation—the application of experimentation.
This is really good stuff and I have no quarrel with it. The mathematics and symbology get rather heady to me since my math ended with
freshman college algebra—but math knowledge is for hire at surprisingly fair prices. Further, much of the mathematical symbology offered
in O R literature is in proof of a rule or relationship, and an ability to
apply the resulting principle does not necessarily require an ability to
understand, i n depth, the mathematical gymnastics required. If it can
be demonstrated that a particular in-put produces a given out-put, the
underlying mathematics can generally be accepted.
Let me review quickly some experience with the pragmatic approach in terms of the three characteristics of O R . I n these two i n stances we did not know we had an O R solution until it was all over.
In our practice we don't really care whether a client chooses to call it
O R or just a good solution to a complex problem—a successful result
and a happy client is the test.
In the first case the management defined the problem as a need for
improved procurement, so we surveyed the purchasing department. The
results revealed a fair purchasing operation—a few ideas here and
there—but really a pretty good job was being done.
What made it tough were the requirements they received from
requisitioners. What was a routine request at 9 a.m. became rush-expedite-emergency by noon and by evening the item was likely to be canceled by the requisitioner. So we reported out and got a license to look
at where the requirements came from. See—the systems approach—we
enlarged the definition of the problem.
Requirements for expendable inventory replenishment—this was
an airline—were determined by some traditional rules of thumb. The
first rule of thumb was: Don't ever be out of anything—ever. A n d the
rules went on from there.
W e l l , we went through the process of classifying the inventory
items first by usage characteristics and when we had wrung out the
large bulk of items subject to statistical control we structured these by
the A - B - C approach. Here we went counter to the O R systems ap-
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proach and yielded to this natural inclination to cut the complex problem down to size. W e decided we still had too big a problem—37,000
items—so we cut it still further to get to the A items—some 2,300
items—and still further to 700 A engine items. W e then selected 12 of
these representing all the different characteristics we could identify and
decided to develop decision rules for managing these items i n terms of
when to buy, how much to buy, and safety stock. W e established some
ground rules to require, for example, that any rules adopted for the
study must be capable of application on a computer, so that we would
have a pragmatic, practical system to apply to all 37,000 items i n due
course.
W e manipulated these 12 items according to various rules and
refinements by applying them to actual usage for the prior 18 months
and comparing our results to what the company had actually achieved.
In other words, we adapted the scientific method and used simulation.
So far it was rather good; we used the system approach and enlarged
the problem but then fell into the error of cutting it down to size. W e
used the scientific method (although we really did not know that was
what it was at the time).
What about the mixed team? So far the team was two of us and a
client man from provisioning—no physicist, no psychologist, no anthropologist—just we three. Not really a mixed team although we were
sort of mixed up at that point. T o prove we were mixed up we decided
to bring i n the math talent with O R experience, supposedly to tell us
what the mathematics were behind the solution we had so we might improve it. Yes, we had a solution that worked—so good i n fact that the
ultimate system reduced inventory levels by $5,500,000 or one 707's
worth—but the success was not proven out at this point.
The math talent was a decidedly pure purist and made the observation quite early that you really can't solve the problem the way we had
solved it. First of all, our data were not good. W e had only monthly
usage figures and only usage that was recorded i n a month, not what
was i n fact used that month. Weren't we aware of the fact that flying
hours are heavier in certain months than i n others, on certain days than
on others, in daylight hours than at night? Didn't we take note of
the fact that some items were common to more than one type aircraft
while others were peculiar to a type? O u r math friend said the first
order of business was obviously to refine the data.
Further, our solution was based on the premise that past usage was
the best available practical indicator of future usage and provided means
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for monitoring this usage and coping with it through a unique system
of control limits. W e were told that this too was a serious defect; the
right approach was to find out why parts were used at all, what triggers
usage of any given part (flying hours, number of landings and take-offs
and of what kind, defects i n workmanship, metallurgical properties,
and so on). If we could find the causes of usage we could better
predict usage and manage the inventory.
So right away we had a beautifully enlarged problem—two large
problems i n fact, i.e., data purification and a search for the culprits
causing usage. I guess we also had a third problem—the one we
started w i t h : how to manage inventories better. But then this one would
have to wait its turn.
I could go on but perhaps I have made my point: Pick the right
O R specialist or mathematician. O n our staff we have those who have
been made pragmatic; the other one somehow got away.
In solving complex problems there are common characteristics of
approach having general applicability. Something very similar to the
inventory problem we also applied to airline crew scheduling. The problem was how to schedule crews against a flight schedule to produce the
least cost, or to get the most flying-hours for time paid.
Considering all the restrictions of C A B , company policy, and
multiple union rules this is obviously a complex matter.
The company used rules of thumb and intuitive judgment to take a
given flight schedule and break it into flight segments and combinations
of segments to constitute a set that could be flown by a crew and that
met all the restrictions. Flight pairings originate and end at a crew
domicile. These are posted for bidding by the crews, who select the
"package" they want—and packages are awarded by seniority.
D i d these " b i d packages" represent the least cost i n terms of the
most flying-hours for paid hours?
H o w did we approach this problem? First we examined the company's current flight schedule and concluded that an actual flight schedule contained too many flights and included too many data to be manageable for analysis purposes. Again, we succumbed to the temptation
to cut the problem down to size. Rather than attempt to deal with all
flights in a complete schedule we constructed a hypothetical airline with
only a few cities and a few flights taken from the whole. Selection was
made so as to preserve in the sample the characteristics of the actual
system.
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Each flight i n our hypothetical airline was recorded on individual
index cards showing origins and terminations, time of arrival and departure i n Greenwich mean time, and the hours and minutes consumed.
These cards were then manipulated according to various rules. F o r
example, we began with a first-in, first-out rule. A t the beginning of
any period we assumed that a crew took the first flight out and took it
as far as it was legal under the C A B , union, and other restrictions in
the problem. The crew was then assumed to be given the required rest
and took the next flight out at the end of that period no matter where it
went. This iterative process was applied again and again. Each time
we learned something. F o r example, under a first-in, first-out rule the
crews rarely if ever got back to where they were domiciled until their
monthly flight-hour limits were reached and they dead-headed back.
But we kept this up—try a rule, keep score, refine the rule, try
again, keep score, and so on. Ultimately some fundamental characteristics became apparent. One of the most significant was that the essence
of the matter was a whole series of two-city problems—how to match
up crews and flights between any two cities—rather than the large problem of how to man an entire flight schedule.
The details of the actual solution cannot be gone into here as the
matter is deemed confidential by the company concerned. Essentially
the solution was to apply a series of rules in a prescribed sequence to
make the crew decision regarding each flight i n and out of a given station. A linear programming matrix is applied as part of the process and
provides the least-cost answer. This procedure, including solution of
the matrix, has been programmed for a computer. N o w , in a matter of
minutes, a proposed flight schedule is broken into flight segments, and
the segments are paired and packaged for crew bidding purposes with
assurance that the result is the best possible from a cost standpoint. In
addition, this cost is computed so that an evaluation between alternative flight schedules, so far as crew costs are concerned, is readily
available.
One sidelight was the disclosure that crew domiciles were not in
all cases properly located. A shift in certain domiciles would produce
still further savings in crew costs.
In effect, then, we reduced the problem to manageable proportions:
built a model, simulated, and adopted an available technique (the
matrix). These actions in combination with other techniques gave a
very practical result.
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These efforts were not referred to as Operations Research at the
time;—or, so far as I know, since. This merely illustrates the pragmatic
approach through a logical process of problem-solving.
T H E MANAGER AND OPERATIONS

RESEARCH

The training and experience of most of us, myself included, has
been outside the fields of science and mathematics except for some
orientation courses plus an exposure here and there. This absence of
formal training i n the field is no reason to fear or ignore more scientific
approaches to business problems. W e have one thing (and perhaps the
most important thing) required for successful application—an understanding of the business. Many scientific types do not have and may
never be expected to have this essential ingredient. In one sense the
operations researcher or management scientist is a man with a set of
solutions looking for problems that fit his solutions. The electronics
data-processing salesman or specialist is i n a similar role; he has a
solution or method and seeks his kind of problem. W e have learned,
and many companies have learned, that you are using the wrong approach when you invite the E D P salesman in to have a look around to
see what he would like to mechanize. H e will find areas of interest to
him to be sure, but these are not likely to be those i n the best interests
of the management. So it is with O R and the mathematical sciences.
Management must not abdicate the responsibility for recognizing the
opportunity, defining the problem, identifying the important factors and
relationships, guiding the effort in practical channels, and testing the
solution. Doing these things does not require depth of knowledge of
techniques but awareness of possibilities and the supplying of the most
essential ingredient—understanding the management and the business.
Last December, Business Week reported on a Harvard Graduate
Business School study of the extent that business management has embraced and put into practice "management science" techniques. I n this
study "management science" was given a broad definition to include all
the sciences that can aid managers, from conventional organization
theory through socio-psychology. Under this definition they found
over 80 per cent of the largest corporations taking advantage of one or
more of the new techniques, and this practice extending from obvious
areas such as production scheduling and inventories into personnel,
marketing, and R & D areas. Although this coverage is of interest, I am
most interested i n another conclusion. They state that no matter how
competent the management-science practitioner may be i n his own field,
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few of them are skilled enough i n the art of managing a business. A s
a result the management scientist may come up with sophisticated techniques based on invalid assumptions or with elegant solutions to i n significant problems. The study concludes with the moral that businessmen will have to be around to give some guidance to the scientist
no matter how all-embracing his science may seem.
The mode of functioning of the great entrepreneurs of the 19th
and early 20th century, held in awe for their intuitive shrewdness, is
passe. The professional manager of today finds he has to grub rather
hard to squeeze an inflated profit dollar out of the company's operation.
Generally, he is highly educated and frequently, nowadays, has a liberal
arts, legal, or accounting background. H e is more and more aware of
the basic approaches applied i n the physical sciences, the behavioral
sciences of psychology, sociology, or anthropology, and i n the field of
mathematics, although he generally does not have technical knowledge
in depth in any of these fields. A s he struggles with the problems of
his business he is prone to experiment to see what these other fields
might offer. The climate is right for innovation.
This development is all to the good and the operations researcher
and management scientist have definite contributions to make provided
they recognize—and the manager requires that they recognize—the practical limitations i n business situations. Business is obviously not a
laboratory situation. The economic environment cannot be excluded;
measurement is not very precise; some elements cannot be measured at
all but must be estimated; historical data are spotty; time factors are
likely to be critical; unpredictable people-problems enter in.
Such limitations notwithstanding, a more scientific approach, higher
degree of quantification, and establishment of mathematical relationships among variables i n a matter produce attractive results. What you
usually cannot expect is an absolute answer expressed i n absolute terms
providing absolute certainty to an extent that precludes the need for
applying judgment. What you can expect is a reduction in the area of
uncertainty so that management judgment is applied to the more significant factors with a greater probability of being right a greater percentage of the time.
Much of this technical development applies to what successful
managers have traditionally done. They solved problems by defining
them and specifying the objectives; by identifying the alternatives—the
possible courses of action; by evaluating the alternatives; and by select-
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ing the alternative course of action most nearly meeting the objective.
This process still applies. What is new is the greater range of alternatives, the added degree of precision, the narrowing area of uncertainty;
and, I suppose, a rationale to explain what the successful manager has
been doing, to a degree, all along without being aware of it.
Some of us, I believe, come to approach anything with the operations-research or management-science label as we would a hot i r o n :
W e are afraid to touch for fear of getting burned. These labels are
being applied to an ever broadening subject matter. Perhaps because
these techniques have so recently come to the fore i n the business arena,
some practitioners who adhere to management science in its purer form
feel a need to delineate from the field the others who engage in scientific management in its less pure form. This is done in part by setting
up a set of characteristics and holding that any problem and solution
with these characteristics is an O R problem and an O R solution. Sometimes it seems that any good solution to a difficult problem meets the
standard. Suddenly we find this standard applied retroactively with
Archimedes, Galileo, and others practicing O R through the ages, although they did not know it at the time. The building of such a structure
serves the ego of the pure practitioner and serves to keep the more
timid out of the game.
Perhaps we need two kinds of players. O n one side of the net the
purist, with a scientific point of view and research interest, who will
follow the problem wherever it leads, largely for the problem's sake.
F r o m such endeavors come new ideas and breakthroughs of a conceptual nature. O n the other side of the net we need persons with a business
and profit point of view and with an interest largely in the ends rather
than i n the means. This other side is my side of the net and perhaps
most of you will also find that you are most comfortable here. O n this
side the game is to follow developments closely to recognize the opportunity to apply the techniques, and to adapt and implement solutions
in a practical manner. Those that have not tried this are missing all
the fun and many of the opportunities to make real contributions to
their company's success.
COMPUTERS
The development that permits a more scientific approach to be
practical i n a business situation is the computer. This is not to say that
a computer is always or even generally necessary i n the development of
a better solution but rather in the application of the solution as part of
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regular operations. A good supply of lead pencils and notepaper plus
a desk calculator will take you a long way i n developing a conceptual
solution in most instances. The implementation of the solution where
it entails the repetitive application of decision rules to considerable
quantities of data is where the computer generally comes into play.
The business computer has been with us for about ten years. Only
now are we beginning to learn to use E D P equipment effectively. Business applications fall into two broad categories—those things such as
payrolls, billings, and disbursements that must be performed merely to
stay i n business day-to-day, and those areas where there are opportunities to get better answers to management questions. W e all know that
the first category was initially computerized in a search for clerical cost
reduction. This has proven to be an elusive target i n many cases. Nowadays more and more companies are coming to realize that electronic
data processing equipment should be used to get better answers to management questions; to enable the company to handle more complex
problems; to allow routine decisions to be handled electronically, reserving the exceptions for personal attention; to allow application in
practice of theories that, although they may have been known, were
heretofore impractical. These are areas of particular interest outside
the financial-accounting area, and more and more we find ourselves
talking to marketing, production, and chief executives who have initiated an interest.
Again i n the area of computers I prefer to take the pragmatic or
practical approach. Let's not consider the hardware until we have considered the problem. What are we trying to achieve? how is it to be
achieved? what are the decision rules? what would we do differently if
we had more or different information? These are the questions, really—
not what would we or could we do if we had a computer. The computer is a means to an end; define the ends first. H o w simple this
principle is, how commonly it is violated.
W e all follow developments i n the computer field and generally, I
think, find the literature heavily salted with superlatives. This is a big
field and getting bigger and is tailored for the big thinker. The primary
problem created by the use of superlatives is to lead those who want to
act now to expect too much too soon and to fail to recognize how difficult it actually is to use a computer at all.
I have no reason to question the predictions being made for the
computerized life in the future. But as with O R and management
science I am more vitally concerned with what can be done better with
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the computer in the near future. If I were to spend too much time
speculating on the ultimate I fear my client or my boss might say "that
is fine but what have you accomplished lately or what can we do between
now and retirement?"
A representative of Bell Laboratories is quoted as stating that
automatic data processing compares to the Darwinian and Copernican
revolutions, both of which changed man's ideas of himself and the
world i n which he lives.
A series of articles in Fortune magazine a few months ago draws
the usual analogy of the computer and the human brain. They speak of
computers that do more than substitute brute force for human cunning;
they speak of computers that increasingly imitate and improve on
human cunning. They speak of the immortal brain whose external
memory store can be expanded indefinitely to include the wisdom of the
ages. (I wonder who distinguishes between wisdom and fallacy?) This
computer would be the paragon of intelligence, able to relate all its
stored knowledge accurately, to reason without being corrupted with
emotion, to discover new relationships between old things, to solve more
problems than anyone ever solved before, even to create works of art.
Another article in the Fortune series deals with machines that man
can talk with. W e already have machines that can "talk" to each other
and perhaps i n some installations this may be an advantage. While the
machines are busy with each other the managers will be free to deal with
company affairs.
A l l this is interesting, as speculation, but as a pragmatist I must
focus on the here and now with only an occasional look at the stars.
Another Fortune article deals with on-line, real-time computer systems. On-line, real-time extends the application of computers to achieve
the "total system." Apparently the "total system" is one i n which all
relevant information on all aspects of an organization are instantaneously available. Relevant is a key word here. While the computermen are extending the capacities of their systems to cope with total systems the management-men have much to do—they have not done much—
to determine what is relevant. This question has been with us for a long
time already and before computers came into play. What do you really
need to know to run the whole business—to run any part of the business? Not only what do you need to know but how often, i n what detail,
and how current must the information be? The financial executive has
a real stake as well as a contribution to make i n this area.

322

SELECTED

PAPERS

In an airline reservation system the advantage of an on-line, realtime system is apparent. In a management information system the
matter of defining requirements is much more critical. Does the manager need to know, or is he able to know, anything about everything all
the time? I recall learning that the manager should think ahead and not
be concerned with what is happening at the moment except as it may
give a clue to the future. Others at the lower echelons are concerned
with the hour-to-hour problems of every day. If we are not careful we
are likely to build computerized information systems that cater to the
top manager's passion to feel and react to the bumps i n the road being
traveled at the moment. They may also assist subordinates to yield to
the inclination to let decisions be made by those above him. Everyone
can't effectively deal with both tactics and strategy at the same time.
Strategy is the more important and is the province of the general management. H i s purpose may best be served by keeping him out of the
on-line, real-time flow of data.
Y o u know, all developments do not come automatically through
analysis of a flow of past data. I don't suppose Edison's idea for the
electric lamp came through a focus on a flow of data. H e thought of
the idea based on other observations and used data only i n the refinement of his idea to avoid past mistakes. Too great a concern for data
as the source of wisdom can be an impediment to imagination and innovation—which are what we expect from our managers.
I am far from a skeptic regarding computers but I am a realist.
Successful installations begin with a cold hard look at the purpose—a
search for a better way. Don't worry too much about the hardware, for
they will come up with an even better machine while you are defining
your objectives. The application of a computer requires the most careful
analysis of the components of a problem and extremely clear thinking
on what is required to get a certain result. What a shame if such analysis does not lead to questioning the purpose, need, and approach to
dealing with each element.
ROLE OF FINANCIAL

EXECUTIVES

What effect is all this development i n operations research-management science and computers having on the financial executive? I have
made no survey and have no statistics to present—only observations. It
would seem to be clearly too early for anyone to have conclusions—
only speculation is i n order at this point and there is plenty of that
going on.
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Professor Thomas L . Whisler at the University of Chicago has followed developments and feels that the big changes are yet to come and
when they do they will largely come at the managerial level—and that
includes the financial executive. So far he sees a flattering of the organization structure—some areas are combined and reshuffled, reducing the tiers in the structure and the number of managerial positions.
A t the same time he senses a recentralization of control. H e sees the
manager's job i n two parts: (1) computation and evaluation of information, weighing alternatives, and making choices and (2) communication with customers, fellow managers, and the like, including, now,
communications with the computer. The impact of the computer has an
effect largely on the first, or computational phase, permitting more
time for the communications phase but not necessarily reducing the
importance of the job as a whole. H e also observes that chief executives
are beginning to recognize the power of the computer and its effect and
are less prone to delegate responsibility for it.
Professor Whisler came close to the mark when he also observed
that in companies where the management science-computer impact has
resulted i n reorganizations, the managers who survived and thrived were
those who early saw the advantages of the new systems and new organizations. This has, it would seem to me, a clear message for the
financial executive. Much of the opportunity is for those who take a
positive view, get i n the act, and make a contribution.
The financial executive clearly had the inside track at the beginning—not so much on the OR-management side of things as these people
frequently come into the picture by other sponsorship. But on the
computer side the financial executive was almost always the one sought
out by the equipment manufacturer's representative, as he was the one
who traditionally handled numbers equipment. I n some companies the
financial executive took the initiative and has kept it. In a great number
of other cases he has not.
I really don't know a general rule for stating to whom the management science and computer areas rightfully belong, if right has anything
to do with it. Under the theories of organization that I was brought up
on, the financial executive was the one, other than the chief executive,
who was supposed to be i n a position to have an over-all view of corporate affairs. Accounting was supposed to be all-pervasive and to
cover all areas i n the corporation. The financial executive position was
the one that was epitomized by the term "functional control" and he
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was supposed to control, functionally, the numbers game wherever it
was played.
Lately, this whole concept is getting rather badly bent. W e find
corporate directors of planning; I thought this was what chief executives were supposed to do personally, without much delegation, but i n
consort with the financial executive—the only other fellow with an
overview of the corporation. W e have vice presidents for administration. W h o are they? Administrative functions used to be divided
between the financial officer and the corporate secretary, depending on
how much time the secretary had left over from his legal and shareholder
work. N o w we find vice presidents for information; I thought information was the merchandise of the treasurer and controller. W e also
see data processing equipment under the direct jurisdiction of marketing
and production units, with little or no influence exercised from the
financial area.
Some observers propose a vice president for information. One
writer in the M a y 1964 Financial Executive ( M r . Gerald G. Fisch)
proposes a vice president for information—and I quote: " W h o is in
charge of all aspects of information generating, processing, and dissemination? It must be his responsibility to determine how management
information needs can best be met. Furthermore, he must have the
intellectual capacity to know what types of analysis performed on various data will produce information of value to the company—whether
the executives in charge of the various functions realize it or not."
(This is a description of more than a service bureau—this author must
have been told, as I was, to make his material controversial.)
A l l of you are aware of this churning in the organizational aspects
of where the management sciences and the computer fit into the organization structure. Some people do not realize that organization planning
is as much an art as it is a science. The perfect structure for one does
not work for another. There are some principles to be sure, but given
a structure, sound in principle, you must then deal with people. The
purist in organization says you set up the right structure and then staff
it—but the pragmatist observes that we already have people on our payroll who don't quite fit, so he bends the structure here and there. It is
getting bent often nowadays when the financial officer doesn't quite fit
what management views as progress.
The place of an O R group in an organization structure depends on
a lot of things i n a given instance, such as the group's purpose, the
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subject matter to be dealt with, and the kind of people who staff it.
Probably the key is to put it where the group will have the right environment to do an effective job; where it will be encouraged; where pains
will be taken to understand what the OR'er wants to do and to understand and communicate what he has done. The executive to whom
such group might report could as well be the financial officer as anyone
else if he is right for the task.
The same considerations apply for the computer. I see good and
bad installations, wherever they may be i n the organization structure.
I also see data processing being taken out of the financial area, rarely
if ever to return. A t least this is the indication so far. Again, whether
or not the financial group regains control depends more on the financial
executive than on some universal law or principle.
The financial executive can, and I have seen it done, assert his
" r i g h t " to the information and management-science function. The F i nancial Executives Institute can attempt to assist by proclaiming this
"right." None of this will do much good—really. In the last analysis it
is up to the man. Has he made a real contribution to his company's
success? Has he been as concerned for what the numbers mean as for
what the numbers are? Has he been willing to innovate and take the
lead in innovation, and very important, has he been able to achieve recognition by the engineers, production and marketing man, and the head
man that he is their kind of person and understands their problem?
Y o u know—financial people—and I mean all of us—have been a part
of some very poor public relations that are still with us. The March 7
Business Week has an ad for M c G r a w - H i l l Publications showing a
full-page picture of the controller wearing a big frown and standing at
the conference table with about a hundred feet of tab run spread out
before him. The caption reads, " F o u r questions to ask your controller
when he says advertising looks too expensive on his cost sheets." A n d
it goes on to lecture the controller on the facts of advertising life.
Shades of Charles Dickens—no high stool, but a conference table; no
leather-bound ledger, but a tab r u n ; no green eyeshade, but a frown.
(The frown was always there but at least the eyeshade hid it.) W e
aren't really like that, are we? A t least not all of us all the time.

